The case for low and simple import tariffs.
India's import tariffs are ~3 times China's and Vietnam's and spread across 44 different rates. Cutting and simplifying them would lower costs for every manufacturer and help create lakhs of factory jobs.
additional jobs needed every year, for the next 10 years
This requires manufacturing exports to grow at nearly double today's rate.
more exports per capita in countries with average tariffs below 10% than in countries above 10%
higher effective tariffs in India than in China and Vietnam
cost disadvantage for Indian manufacturers against competitors like China and Vietnam
Higher input costs due to tariffs drive most of the cost gap.
direct jobs can be created from just matching Vietnam's export share in electronics, engineering goods and apparel
Solving India's jobs problem needs 10% annual growth in manufacturing exports, necessitating deeper Global Value Chain (GVC) integration
High and complex tariffs make manufacturing in India uncompetitive
Case-by-case tariff exemption and trade enabling schemes like SEZs are insufficient to restore export competitiveness
Tariff policy should be designed around export competitiveness with simplicity as a key objective
A three-phase approach can take India to a globally competitive and simpler 3-rate regime
Each year India needs jobs for 200 lakh people, but formal job creation is only about 120 lakh (EPFO additions), leaving a gap of 80 lakh jobs every year. Domestic demand can't absorb the extra output, so it must be exported, and export growth at this scale needs deeper integration into Global Value Chains (GVCs). That requires cost competitiveness and friction-free cross-border movement. A simple and competitive tariff regime is key to both.
Reducing and rationalising tariffs helped India become the world's second-largest mobile phone manufacturer and a global mobile phone export hub.
Lower tariffs also allowed the PLI scheme to work.
Each point is the highest reading in that year. Source: PIB July 2026; FED analysis (report Figure 5).
Swipe sideways to see the full chart.
Illustrative map; not exhaustive. Assembly shares are 2025 estimates based on industry inputs. Source: FED analysis (report Figure 3).
Indian tariffs are effectively 3× higher than China and Vietnam, and input tariffs 2–4× higher. Exporters sell into competitive global markets and cannot pass higher input costs on to buyers. They absorb the cost in lower margins or lose orders. Fewer orders mean less production and fewer jobs.
Trade-weighted, lowest available rate to each source country (standard or FTA), excluding agriculture and cesses. Source: CUSTADA; MOIT; GACC; UN Comtrade; ITC Trade Map; FED analysis.
Source: CUSTADA; MOIT; GACC; UN Comtrade; ITC Trade Map; UNSD BEC; FED analysis.
Indian manufacturers face a 5 to 15% cost disadvantage in key sectors, mostly due to higher tariffs on inputs. Matching Vietnam's export share in these sectors could create ~53 lakh direct jobs.
India today Target (Vietnam's current share of global exports)
Source: ITC Trade Map; ASI 2023-24 MoSPI; FED analysis. Target shares are Vietnam's current shares of global exports. Estimates count direct factory jobs only; on average every direct factory job creates 3 indirect jobs.
Without considering FTAs. Rate count at HS8 level, excluding agriculture. Source: CUSTADA; MOIT; GACC; UN Comtrade; FED analysis.
In 127 product categories, closely related products are taxed at 2 different rates, and in 10 categories at 3 rates. Around 20% of India's imports fall under a catch-all "others" code.
HS6 911430HS8 9114 30 105.5%HS8 9114 30 2011.0%of disputes at the customs level are classification related.
of classification disputes that reach appellate bodies or courts are ruled in favour of industry.
more time for import clearance in India than in China and Vietnam.
Source: stakeholder conversations with former heads of customs and a former CESTAT member; sample of 133 customs cases, 2020 to 2025; National Time Release Study 2025 (CBIC).
Machines used to make and test electronics were exempted from import duty, yet their components carry 8–14% average effective duty. Importing the finished machine is therefore cheaper than building it in India.
Source: CUSTADA; ITC Trade Map; UNSD BEC; FED analysis.
SEZs do not permit level playing field access to the Indian market.
MOOWR does not permit depreciation of capital goods.
EOUs must pay GST upfront on domestic procurement and then claim refund, blocking working capital.
AA relies on outdated standard input-output norms (SION), which limit duty benefit for modern inputs.
Source: FED analysis. See Annexure 5 of the report for the operational challenges exporters face in each scheme.
L2 = components, L3 = intermediates, L4 = raw materials. Source: Annual Survey of Industries 2023-24 MoSPI; CUSTADA; FED analysis (report Figure 13).
Inputs counted once supplier factories further up the chain are included. Source: Annual Survey of Industries 2023-24 MoSPI; CUSTADA; FED analysis (report Figures 13 and 14).
A multimeter is a relatively simple product. Complex products draw on thousands more inputs.
Exemptions cannot cover every input in supply chains this large, and schemes don't solve it either: not every component maker can or will join them.
In an integrated economy, every output is another firm's input. The default should be low and stable tariff rates across the board, with as many products at the zero rate as possible.
Reduce the number of applicable rates and limit variation within closely related product categories. The recent GST reforms applied this principle; extending it to global inputs is critical.
First simplify the structure, then progressively lower tariffs, giving industry predictability and time to adjust at each step.
As part of this consolidation:
Additionally, as part of this phase:
Additionally, target:
These recommendations apply to non-agricultural items only. Source: FED analysis. See Section 5 and Annexure 6 of the report for the rate consolidation methodology.
Geopolitical developments are raising costs for Indian manufacturers just as global supply chains are being reorganised. Lowering and simplifying India's own tariffs directly reduces those costs, regardless of conditions in other markets.
Our experience at home shows that lowering tariffs does not hurt tax collection; instead, it increases it. Over the last 2 decades, while the average tariff we apply on all goods has reduced from 32% to 10%, the central government’s gross direct and indirect tax collections have increased ~5×, from ~INR 4 lakh crore in FY2000 to ~INR 18 lakh crore in FY2023.
Similarly, when GST slabs were cut from 5 to 3 in September 2025, gross GST collection for April to August 2026 was still 11% higher than a year earlier. FED estimates that one additional percentage point of real GDP growth a year would generate enough tax revenue to cover the customs revenue forgone.
Tax collections at constant 2011-12 prices. Source: MoSPI; NITI Aayog; World Bank WDI; GSTN; FED analysis
For the 50 years after independence, India had very high tariffs but failed to build a competitive manufacturing sector. Starting from 1991, lowering tariffs closed some inefficient producers, but manufacturing as a whole expanded and became far more productive. Post 1991, manufacturing in India has grown 7× as average tariffs on manufactured goods have reduced from 82% to 9%.
Protecting strategic sectors such as steel, chemicals and electronic components becomes a tax on every downstream user. Where capability must be built, direct support such as PLI or R&D funding works better, as the electronics sector shows.
"not all import substitution is desirable, and not all forms of protection support long-term competitiveness"Economic Survey of India 2025-26, Chapter 16
Tariffs 1990 to 2022; manufacturing value added in constant 2015 USD. Source: World Bank WDI; FED analysis
This assumes exporters live in a separate policy universe. Few firms build factories only for export: the same plant, suppliers, machines and workers serve both markets.
Scheme-based relief often requires firms to separate production, location, documentation, and compliance according to whether goods are sold abroad or at home.
A manufacturer in a low-tariff country does not have to decide whether to locate in an SEZ, operate under MOOWR, follow EOU norms or seek Advance Authorisation just to neutralise input duties. An Indian manufacturer does.
Around 90% of India’s imports from China are raw materials, intermediate goods, and capital goods.
If India raises tariffs broadly in response to concerns about China, it may reduce some imports, but it will also raise costs for Indian manufacturers who rely on these inputs. The result can be counterproductive: in trying to protect a few domestic firms, we will make the rest of Indian manufacturing less competitive.
A better response is a calibrated diversification strategy: identify products where dependence on China creates strategic vulnerability and actively diversify sourcing.
Source: UN Comtrade; industry consultations; FED analysis
Even excluding its extensive FTA network, 64% of Vietnam's imports enter at a duty rate of 2.5% or less. Vietnam’s example tells us that while FTAs are helpful in reducing tariffs, they are not a substitute for unilateral tariff reduction.
Moreover, FTA benefits are slow to materialise. Firms must meet rules of origin and certification to claim preferences, which is hard in complex supply chains. Agreements take years to negotiate and phase in, and often exclude critical products.
FTAs should be seen as complementary to tariff reduction and rationalisation, not a substitute for it.
Source: CUSTADA; MOIT; FED analysis (Annexure 7)
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